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FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL ATTITUDES
TOWARD WELFARE RECIPIENTS' RIGHTS AND
PRIVILEGES: A SURVEY.
RAYMOND A. SHAPEK*
Beginning with the Elizabethan Poor Laws of the Sixteenth century,
cultural predispositions and ingrained attitudes concerning welfare have
been reified to form the basis of our existing social and legal attitudes
on this topic. This heritage is reflected in a chain of ideologies transmitted
through our elected representatives and translated into existing welfare
laws.
Increasing automation in 20th Century America has made the recipient
of public welfare a cog in the wheels of administrative procedure. Rights
and privileges are defined morally according to community values. Laws
conditioning the receipt of welfare are predicated on these values. The
courts, with their high costs and time delays have remained one of the few
avenues of redress, but are a vehicle little understood, feared and ill-af-
forded by those subject to the whim of the administrative and moral in-
terpretation.
This study concerns the origins and evolution of public attitudes about
rights and privileges accorded recipients of public welfare as reflected in
welfare laws in the United States.
English Heritage
The English poor-law system originated with the Poor Law Act of
1598 which was passed by the Ninth Parliament of Elizabeth I of England.
The poor laws, directly and indirectly, may be credited with laying the
foundations or precedents for laws and attitudes that exist today. In the
original poor laws and related legislation we find the "means test,"' re-
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Southwest Texas State University;
B.A., San Fernando Valley State College, 1962; B.A., University of Maryland,
1968; M.P.A., University of Colorado, 1969; Ph.D., University of Colorado, 1971.
' The "means test" required parents or children of poor persons to contribute
to their support when they had sufficient means. This obligation was extended to
grandparents in 1601 and reinforced as late as the Poor Law Act of 1930. Familial
responsibilities have also been upheld in the U.S. See, for example;
(1) Snell v. Wyman, 393 U.S. 323 (1969).
Where welfare departments may confiscate tort recoveries and inheritances from
A.F.D.C. (aid to families with dependent children) recipients;(2) Woods v. Miller, 70-780 (W.D. PA., 1970).
(3) Carleson v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. Rptr. 635 (Calif. Ct. app. 1972).
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strictions on indigent travel, the idea of local responsibility for the poor,
forced labor or make work projects, governmental wage subsidies, public
attitudes toward the poor as a class of persons deemed to be shiftless,
lazy and genetically inferior, and class distinctions made by society in
questions of restitutionary rights versus privileges.
The poor laws were brought about by an admixture of compassion for
the needy and a fear of disturbance. They were based upon a minimum of
social amelioration and maximum deterrence.
Sixteenth century England was changing from a basically feudal
farming society to an industrial one. The maintenance of peace was a con-
tinuous problem when the English Lords erected enclosures and turned
arable land into pastures in order to pursue the much more profitable
industry of wool growing. As the farm land disappeared, thousands of
peasants were displaced. These displaced peasants roamed the land re-
sorting to begging, thievery, or whatever menial work that could be
found. However, the right of mobility was restricted to the parish by the
1662 Act of Settlement and Removal. The parish became a "country"
to which the indigent was bound by birth. Further, roving indigents could
be forceably brought back to their native parishes which were legally obli-
gated to provide relief.
In the parish, unpaid overseers of the poor, under the direction of Jus-
tices of the Peace, were appointed to provide for the poor and to tax the
parishioners in each jurisdiction. The duties of the overseer included
supervising the able-bodied poor on jobs intended to return some money
to the system. The result of these efforts was often forced labor or make-
work tasks, not too dissimilar to many work schemes for indigents to-
day.' Unfortunately, the overseers were often corrupt or incompetent
and the work system failed to solve the problem of swelling welfare rolls.
The system failed completely with the passage of the Speenhamland
law in 1795. The Speenhamland Law provided a governmental subsidy
when wages fell below an established scale. Employers naturally paid be-
low scale.' Further stigma was attached to the receipt of this form of
subsistence allowance as a charity.
In the cities, the general public ignorance of conditions of the working
classes and their residence areas, which later became known as slums and
'C. F. Ramas v. County of Madera, 484 P.2d 93 (Calif. Sup. Ct. 1971).
Speenhamland Law was repealed in 1834. The failure of subsidized employ-
ment with a goal toward creating a minimum income policy creates a precedent
of doubt in President Nixon's welfare reform proposals (HR. 1, 1969).
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today ghettos, strengthened the conception that the poor were merely shift-
less. The physical degradation induced by these conditions stamped the
slum dwellers as a race apart. The slum dwellers, in turn, discouraged
with their lot in life and unable to improve their condition, turned to
drink. The immorality engendered by the overcrowded conditions and the
desperate hopelessness compounded by dirt, disease and misery made most
people caught in these circumstances apathetic, and indifferent to their
surroundings.
Thus, the Sixteenth century provided the underpinnings of belief that
the poor possessed certain inherent characteristics which society could
not change, but might regulate. Social responsibility became synonymous
with gratuity, amelioration with compulsory forced work schemes, and
poorhouses and poverty with genetic predisposition.4
American Heritage
The Eighteenth and Nineteenth century New England colonies strong-
ly identified with the economic and religious doctrines of the Puritans of
England. The immigrants to America followed their English counterparts
in derogating economic assistance to the poor. Practically, peddlers or
vagrants were threats to the tenuous thread of self-sufficiency in the
colonies and little could be spared for nonproductive members. Moreover,
the early colonists could not tolerate deviations from the social and re-
ligious norms of community life. The Puritan ethic viewed poverty or
wealth as a demonstration of God's grace. Riches were proof of goodness
and favor while insufficiency and poverty were evidence of evil and re-
jection.5 Charity was regarded as a family responsibility.
The administration of poor relief followed the English pattern. In
'Excellent background material on the economic status of England during
this period may be found in Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Co., 1957). See also, D. L. Hobman, The Welfare State (Lon-
don: John Murray, Ltd., 1953); Maurice Bruce, The Coming of the Welfare State
(New York: Schocken Books, Inc., 1966); for a discussion of conditions within
the workhouses see James Farndale, ed., Trends in Social Welfare (London: Per-
gamon Press, Ltd., 1965); on the Speenhamland Law see Samuel Mencher, Poor
Law to Poverty Program (Pittsburgh Press, 1967).
' The Reverend Thomas Hooker rejected the idea that the poor should be aided
or supported by the community: "neither rule nor reason leads us or allows us to
relieve the poor by all our good things." Quoted from Mencher, id., p. 43. This, of
course, excluded the church which was then and is now supported by the public and
aided by governmental tax relief. See also, R. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of
Capitalism (London: John Murray, 1926), and Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic
and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans, by Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles E.
Scribner, 1958).
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New England, the town was the principle unit of aid. In the southern
colonies, the parish was the central agent, but was held responsible to the
county court. In New York, the church assumed responsibility for
charity. However, all colonies sought to avoid governmental relief sys-
tems. Some colonies adopted the practice of restricting entry and deport-
ing undesirables.6 Only the Dutch settlers organized work-relief programs
for the poor. However, the New England towns did provide a reduction of
taxes, and food and clothing at reduced prices for the needy. Generally, the
few demands made by the poor were met by negative spirit and action.
American Ethics
Early American social norms reflected the commercial ideals of the
Protestant ethic, the notion of social contract as interpreted by Locke, and
the ideology of the "natural" equality of man. Also, many theorists have
espoused the proposition that the Federalist position reflected at the
"Grand Convention" of 1787 could be summarized as an association solely
for the protection of life and property. The theories of social contract,
equality and protection of property may be extended to a system of welfare
laws formulated by the "haves" as a form of protection against the "have
nots." Since this was an underlying purpose in the Elizabethan poor laws,
it is not too remote to infer this same motivation in the development of
our own welfare legal system. However, while maintaining the same legal
attitudes about the nature of poverty, early American state and county
welfare systems gave way to more localized control while the English
turned increasingly to centralized governmental direction which has cul-
minated in an almost completely socialized welfare system. Even at this
early date reform liberals in England and the United States espoused ed-
ucation as a means of preparing the lower classes to improve their social
position, and saving to learn the habit of thrift. Numerous temperance
societies were formed to combat the immorality associated with poverty.
In accordance with our religious mores, charitable organizations em-
phasized the importance of the contribution of the individual. They felt
that individual initiative rather than the force of society should 'be the
stimulus for change. Opportunity could always be found along the ex-
panding frontiers. The offspring of this philosophy was the paternalistic
benevolence of the wealthy industrialists and businessmen of the period.
' Indigents have traditionally been unwelcome arrivals in the U.S. in spite of the
greeting noted on the Statue of Liberty. An Act Concerning Passengers in Vessels
Coming to the Port of New York sought to regulate such arrivals under the state's
police powers as late as 1824. See: N. Y. v. Miln, 11 Peters 102 (1837).
4
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Another element of American tradition that is worthy of note was the
attitude toward foreigners and their customs. During the colonial period,
immigrants were viewed as intruders for economic and religious reasons.
Many settlers from Southern and Eastern Europe, and notably Ireland
following the potato famine, arrived in America destitute. During the
Nineteenth century, they became the consistent scapegoats for all the
problems of the ricocheting economy; as the Negro of today is blamed for
the problems of the cities. Foreigners were held responsible for the crowded
cities, low wages, and periodic depressions. They were blamed for their
poverty, their slums, and crime. The Social Darwinists viewed foreigners
as an unfit and inferior species. The only solution provided by the welfare
agencies appearing in the cities was to gather poor slum children together
and send them to farms in the country where they were frequently ex-
ploited. At the end of this era, a gradual shift occurred from the idea of
individual to social causation as the determinate of poverty, although the
fear of the consequences of public relief remained tenaciously welded to the
belief in the defective character of the recipients. The one bright star on the
horizon was the increased use of scientific social research techniques, which
attempted to view poverty objectively rather than subjectively and mor-
alistically. Facts and figures began to offset myths.
An Increased Role for Government
In the late 1800's and early 1900's, the growing complexity of social
and economic life resulted in increasing social intervention by government.
The haphazard public relief system suffered most during the frequent de-
pressions that followed the Civil War. Great numbers of unemployed
crowded -the cities and demanded special governmental action. However,
the greatest welfare burden was borne by private philanthropic organiza-
tions. The primary distinction between the private and governmental
approach to welfare assistance was that in the first case stress was placed
on the social and economic conditions affecting the general well-being of
the recipient while the latter adhered to a preoccupation with the unique
individual characteristics which led to failure.
Governmental interest in public welfare turned briefly to private in-
surance schemes and the illusion that welfare administration might de-
velop as a private instead of public administrative burden. However, the
means for a more direct role for government arose with the passage of the
Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution in 1913.' This amendment has
'Nowhere in the Constitution is a responsibility for welfare mentioned, except
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provided not only a large and secure resource, but was related to the
ability of the taxpayer to pay.
The shambles of the Hoover administration gave way to the Great
Depression of the Thirties and a growing recognition that the economic
system was not an end in itself, but a means to man's welfare. In a 1934
message to Congress, President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated the objec-
tives in a modern state's responsibility to its citizens:
Among our objectives I place the security of the men, women and
children of the nation first .This security for the individual and for the
family concerns itself primarily with three factors. People want decent
houses to live in; they want to locate them where they can engage in
productive work; and they want some safeguard against misfortunes
which cannot be wholly eliminated in this manmade world of ours.
The means of attaining these objectives have yet to be translated into laws.
Social Security
America began with the myth of an "endless frontier" for expansion
and unhampered opportunities for every man to earn a living free of the
social encumbrances that hampered England and Europe---every able-
bodied man could find a job if he really wanted to work. Also, there was
a firm belief that any responsible industrious and thrifty man could set
aside enough money during his productive years to provide for temporary
bad times as well as sickness and old age. Despite evidence to the contrary,
the false image of each man's productivity extending to 75 years of age
which had applied to life on the farm, was extended to city workers in an
age of industrialization. By 1929, reality proved that employment for those
over 40 was almost non-existent. Benefits available for the average worker
included limited workman's compensation, private life insurance, and little
else. Also, the employment situation in 1929 differed from earlier eras.
The vast frontiers of expansion had largely closed and the United States
had become a nation of employers and employees, rather than farmers.
Of the 49 million gainful workers in the 1930 census, only 4 million were
listed as farm laborers.
The long term collapse of the economy in the period 1930-1936 brought
a realization that an industrial society required a carefully planned system
of meeting the needs of millions who could be deprived of employment
in Art. I. Section 8, Cl. 1, where the powers to collect taxes and "provide for the
common defense and general welfare of the United States," are linked.
6
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through no fault of their own.8 The indictment that the unemployed were
intrinsically lazy, intellectually inferior and improvident could not logically
be extended to cover one-third of the work force. With the fact of 15 mil-
lion persons unemployed in 1934, the situation demanded unprecedented
action by government. Accordingly, President Roosevelt announced his
desire for a broad social insurance program to protect individuals from the
major economic hazards of the fluctuating economy. Roosevelt's Commit-
tee on Economic Security submitted a report to Congress in early 1935
which, with minor modifications, was passed by the House and Senate
and signed into law by August 14, 1935.'
The Act was not viewed favorably by all. Governor Landon, the Re-
publican candidate for the Presidency in 1936, characterized the Act as
"unjust, unworkable, stupidly drafted, and wastefully financed." 1 Many
workers opposed the jobless compensation scheme which permitted others
to obtain money for not working. Fear was expressed that large cor-
porations would throw men out of jobs in order to avoid payroll taxes.
Others viewed the Act as the first step leading to the collapse of the political
and economic structure, the usurpation of sovereign state's rights and an
impingement on individual liberties."
The Social Security Act may have justified Landon's criticism of the
measure as a cruel hoax on the American people. It rendered assistance to
the jobless, but did not eliminate the major causes of insecurity.'2 There
was no protection offered against illness, the premature death of the head
of household, or against industrial accidents, something the states had con-
tinuously refused to act upon. Instead, it provided tragically inadequate
protection for a minority of the population. 3
' In the campaign of 1932, FDR had pledged federal government assistance and
acknowledged a national responsibility for financial assistance relief. See Herbert
L. Marx, Jr., ed., The Welfare State (New York: the H. W. Wilson Co., 1950).
' Excellent details on the passage of the Act are contained in Birchard E. Wyatt
and William H. Wandel, the Social Security Act in Operation (Washington, D.C.:
Graphic Arts Press, Inc., 1937).
"0 Maxwell S. Stewart, Social Security (New York: W. W. Norton and Co.,
Inc., 1937), p. 142.
" Also the free movement of labor would be impaired and the capitalist system
destroyed. The idea that business was entitled to large profits because of the risks
involved was defended over the rights of workers. "As long as it was the welfare
of the propertied classes that was being advanced the work stood as Holy Writ.
But the horrors of the 'welfare state' were shouted from the roof-tops when the
Federal Government began to spend money to aid the great groups in our society
that had little or no property,"-from "Are We Headed Toward Collectivism?"
by Senators Harry F. Byrd and Paul H. Douglas in Marx, op. cit., p. 83.
" No payments were made under the insurance schedule until 1942 in order for
the reserve to develop.
" Farm workers, share-croppers, domestic servants and women--essentially
7
Shapek: Foundations of Legal Attitudes toward Welfare Recipients' Rights
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1973
210 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
Provisions of the Act
The framers of the Social Security Act envisioned the act as a final
and lasting contribution by the federal government to public assistance.
The public assistance provisions were not originally designed to create
benefits for the unemployed, but rather were intended to encourage the
states to adopt systems of jobless compensation of their own.1 4
A joint responsibility for the protection of certain classes was acknowl-
edged between federal, state and local agencies.15 Grants to the states would
be made once -the states had submitted public-assistance plans to the federal
government for approval. Among the standards applicable for approval of
state plans, inherited predispositions of our English heritage were re-
flected in the following:
1) A state plan must apply to all of its political subdivisions and be
mandatory to them.
2) The state must provide a portion of the cost of financing the pro-
gram.
3) The state must provide the opportunity for a fair hearing to any
person whose claim for assistance is denied.'
4) Assistance payments must be made in cash, and not in groceries
or services.
5) Half of any money collected from the estates of recipients of old-
age assistance must be paid to the federal treasury.
those, with low incomes, particularly Negroes and excluded workers in exempt
groups were provided grossly inadequate benefits, if any, because of the annuity
scheme. The system, of course has been greatly expanded since 1935. See James
Tobin and W. Allen Wallis, Welfare Programs: An Economic Appraisal (Wash-
ington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1968).i l Taxes were employed to strengthen the Act (26 U.S.C. Supp. v. Sect. 1400).
The tax provisions were upheld in Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 10; 81 L.Ed. 1307
(1937). Alabama's (state) unemployment compensation tax (law) was upheld in
Carmichael v. Southern Coal and Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 81 L.Ed. 1245 (1936).
"5 Under the grant-in-aid system that was employed, the government was not
responsible for administering public assistance, which included the classes of needy
aged (Title I), dependent children (Title IV), and the needy blind (Title X). This
responsibility was delegated to the states. Most states gave the task of administra-
tion to the counties, which have accepted the responsibility grudgingly. See, for
example, Raymond A. Shapek, "The Cost of Welfare: Who Pays," Conference
Board Record (May, 1972).
"e The fair hearing requirement has proved an administrative nightmare for
supervising agencies but has generally worked. H.E.W. is currently under pressure
from a number of states, especially New York, New Jersey, and California, to
weaken many of the important features of the fair hearing regulation (45 C.F.R.
Sect. 205.10). Their opposition is to the requirement that in cases of suspension,
reduction or termination of eligibility, full payment must be continued pending a
state hearing decision. These states wish to return to the previously applied local
fair hearing date as a payment termination point.
8
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6) Old-age assistance and aid to the blind plans may not impose
residency requirements to exclude applicants who have resided in the state
for five of the preceding nine years preceding application and one con-
tinuous year immediately prior to application. Nor may the plans impose
citizenship requirements. 17
7) The purpose of the programs is to provide assistance to "needy"
individuals. The exact definition of need was left to each state.' 8
Within these basic provisions lie the summation of our heritage con-
cerning the rights of indigents as interpreted by society.' 9 To this point,
we find a bias against the indigent and a generalized feeling of responsi-
bility by government for the plight of the poor, but reluctance, especially
on the part of local government to assume this burden. Perhaps as part
of our unique materialism and individualism groups emerged dependent on
(while society condoned) a system of government payments or subsidies.
Welfare grants became identified (and scorned) as gratuities while other
grants became recipient rights.
Rights and Privileges of Indigents
Welfare has traditionally been considered a gratuity to be granted or
withheld at the discretion of the legislature."0 The laws concerning welfare
1 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 39 U.S. 168 (1969), for an affirmation of the indi-
gents right to travel. The denial of public assistance on the grounds of nonresidency
was ruled a denial of due process; see also Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 65
(E.D. Penn. 1967; however, residency requirements have been upheld in county
welfare programs (General assistance) where no federal funds are involved; Peace
v. Hansen, 483 P.2d 720 (Mont. Sup. Ct. 1971).
18 In establishing the criteria for eligibility, Title IV defines needy child as "a
dependent child . . . who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason
of death, continual absence from home, or physical or mental incapacity of the
parent." Since a determination of "need" is required as a condition of eligibility,
state plans must employ some form of "means" test. All but item 3 are expressions
of enforced local responsibility. Item 3 is a manifestation of the increased role of
the national government in the protection of individual rights against impingement
by the states which appears to have reached its apogee in the U. S. Supreme Court
decisions of the Warren era. State plans may sometimes be held invalid; see Conn.
St. Dept. of Public Welfare v. Department H.E.W., 448 F.2d 209 (1971).
" Basic rights defined by the U.S. Supreme Court include the right of liberty
equality, property and contract, the right to live, marry and rear children and to
maintain a home; see Mayers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Other scholars
go further and include welfare as a right to demand from government the economic
necessities of life; see, James P. Cooney and H. David Prior, "Social Welfare
Searches and the Social Security Act." Yale Law Journal, 72 (June, 1963), 610. A
legal "right is derived from membership in a group which is entitled to aid under a
statute."
0 Frisbie v. U.S., 157 U.S. 160 (1895). This judicial doctrine was not aban-
doned until 1963. See, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398; See also, James P. Conney
and H. David Prior, "Social Welfare-An Emerging Doctrine of Statutory En-
titlement," 44 Notre Dame Lawyer, 603 (1969).
9
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developed on the gratuity theory and, the receipt of public welfare could
be made subject to whatever conditions the state chooses to impose. 21 Wel-
fare payments have characteristically been treated as privileges. Social
welfare legislation has also incorporated its own unique characteristics.
It has been defined as legislation that, among other things, sets up some
minimum standard against which need of a particular group is measured.
22
In practice welfare legislation has drawn a distinction between pro-
grams designed to assist the "middle-class" as a due, and charity programs
in aid to indigents. In "middle-class" programs benefits are considered
a right since eligibility has been earned and 'benefits are restitutionary:
in this instance a "means" test is avoided. The characteristics of "charity"
legislation are completely the reverse.23 The rationale of rights based on
some contribution, versus privileges has been the continued justification
for the Social Security Act and subsequent increases in payments. For
example, in 1949, ,the "Report of the Advisory Council to the Senate Com-
mittee on Finance" noted:
Differential benefits . . . based on a work record are a reward for
productive effort and are consistent with general economic incentives,
while the knowledge that benefits will be paid.. . irrespective of whether
the individual is in need ... supports and stimulates his drive to add his
personal savings to the basic security he has acquired through the in-
surance system. Under such a social insurance system, the individual
earns a right to a benefit that is related to his contribution to produc-
tion. This earned right is his best guarantee that he will receive the
benefits promised, and that they will not be conditional on his accepting
either scrutiny of his personal affairs on restrictions from Which others
are free.2
Following our cultural heritage, the legislative system has thus main-
tained a differentiation between privileges that are rights for those who con-
tribute, and privileges granted, withheld, or made conditional for non-
contributors. However, there is no direct correlation between the value of
" Charles A. Reich, "Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging
Legal Issues," 74 Yale Law Review, 1245 (1965).
2 Lawrence N. Friedman, "Social Welfare Legislation: An Introduction,"
21 Stanford Law Review, 221 (1969).
"For example, the recipients of farm subsidies, veterans pensions, educational
benefits or even work-study programs hardly view themselves as on the government
dole, much less as welfare recipients.
" Jacobus Tenbroek and Richard B. Wilson, "Public Assistance and Social
Insurance-A Normative Evaluation," 1 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 237. Note the reflections
of the Puritan ethic?
10
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the contribution made and the actuarial value of the benefits to which these
contributions entitle a person ... in social insurance or subsidy, entitlement
is earned regardless of the amount of prior contribution.
Legislative Prerogative: The Majority Will
Rights and privileges in welfare legislation reflect the will of the
people."5 In spite of the inequities in legislative apportionment of welfare
funds, the federal courts have avoided intrusion into the realm of legis-
lative prerogative.2 6 There is also no constitutional limitation or standard
by which to defend the types of benefits that may be made available and
the manner by which such benefits may be regulated.27 The welfare re-
cipient is left to the mercy of the legislature which may ignore whatever
standards or conditions of eligibility for benefits it may choose, with at
times, little regard for the rights of the individual.2 "
Welfare implies dependence and dependence means that people may
more easily be induced to part with rights they would ordinarily defend.
Some officials feel that opening one's home to unannounced inspection is
a reasonable condition to the receipt of public funds. The poor may be
asked to observe standards of morality not imposed on more affluent mem-
bers of the community and be forced to endure officially condoned con-
descension, derogation and prying into even the most personal aspects
of their lives.29
2" Legislative roll-call analysis of the 83rd-88th Congress (1953-64) revealed
that voting on economic policy is more subject to constituency constraints. AAge
Clausen and Richard B. Cheney, "A Comparative Analysis of Senate-House Voting:
on Economic and Welfare Policy: 1953-1964," American Political Science Review,
LXIV (March, 1970).
" The Legislature's function, is to formulate policy and establish legal struc-
tures to deal with the problems: the legal system's function is to determine whether
the legislature has overstepped its legal power. "The wisdom of a particular pro-
vision or the policy judgment it represents are not legal issues and should be ad-
dressed to the legislature and not the courts," see Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc,,
348 U.S. 483 (1955).
27 Snell v. Wyman, supra.
2 Cooney and Prior found only three categorical legal restraints on legislatively
imposed eligibility requirements in the area of public assistance: (1) The uncon-
stitutional conditions test . . . unconstitutional conditions may not legally be attached
to the receipt of benefits in such a way that the recipient of the benefit is forced to
choose between the benefit and the relinquishment of a constitutional right-see
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). (2) The responsible relationship test ...
The conditions placed on a determination of assistance eligibility must be reasonably
related to the purpose of the statute under which the assistance is made available.
(3) The statutory construction test-state welfare statutes must be consistent with
the purpose of the controlling federal staute. Op. cit., 629.
2" Charles A. Reich, "Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act,"
72 Yale L.J. 1359 (1963).
11
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Administrative and Legislative Coercion
In some states, mothers of illegitimate children are dissuaded from
applying for assistance by threats of neglect proceedings which will lead
to the loss of custody of the child or children. While receiving assistance, if
the mother gives birth to an illegitimate child, she is subject to the charge
that the latest pregnancy constitutes "neglect" of the previous children.
In Los Angeles, the welfare department recently terminated aid to needy
children in all such cases, ,thus purging the rolls of some 23,000 children
because of actions by the mother." Reich delineated seven major areas in
which conditions are usually attached to determining eligibility of re-
cipients or continued receipt of benefits: 1) Privacy-midnight raids and
other intrusions in the house are justified on moral grounds; 2) Respon-
sibility-states seek to impose duties of financial responsibility on relatives
of indigents beyond that which is required by general law; 3) Residence-
laws are designed to hinder migration and travel by indigents and estab-
lish elaborate residency requirements; 4) Employment-able-bodied per-
sonnel must work to be eligible for assistance; 5) Housing-public hous-
ing authorities are given 'the power to select and oust tenants at will, and
often employ month-to-month leases (which promote insecurity) ; 6) Loy-
alty Oaths-written and verbal oaths are required as a condition of re-
ceipt of benefits; 'and last, 7) Criteria of Eligibility-eligibility is deter-
mined on a selective 'basis with a great deal of discretion being given to the
individual case worker.3 '
Remedies
Many disputes over state regulations affecting welfare recipients
could be settled by the Secretary of H.E.W., who has the power under the
Social Security Act to issue regulations governing federally supported
state programs or to disapprove programs that, in his judgment, do not
conform to federal standards. He may exercise this power, or the ultimate,
but not feasible, sanction of withholding federal funds from the offending
state. Administrative action by H.E.W. in these instances would save
untold costs and hardship on those least able to contest unfair state practices
"0 The L.A. action was later ruled invalid by H.E.W. Also in California, a
woman using any portion of a grant to support a man "assuming the role of spouse"
may be charged with the crime of misusing the funds. People v. Shirley, 360 P.2d
33, 55 Cal. App. 2d 521 (1961). In Washington, D.C., the courts were faced with
the question of whether a mother of nine should be denied funds because her hus-
band visited her too frequently. Simmons v. Simmons, Civil No. D 2545-61, D.C.
Ct. of Gen. Sess. Domestic Relations Branch (1964).
81 Ibid., pp. 1247ff.
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through the long process of litigation.12 Where negotiation between the
state welfare agency or the state and H.E.W. has failed, the matter must
be decided by the courts.
In some cases, H.E.W. may challenge the offending state statute rather
than impose the ultimate sanction of termination of relief. For example,
in Brodie v. Wyman,33 H.E.W. filed an amicus curiae brief challenging
the validity of payments-of-benefits differentials -between welfare recipients
in New York City and other parts of the state. 4 In other cases, it is the
burden of the recipient himself to bring his complaint to the courts. His
particular problem may not lend itself to class action support. Many such
cases involve seemingly minor issues, such as the right of welfare re-
cipients to receive rent security deposits,8 5 for necessary repairs to one's
home,8 6 and for the reissuance of lost food stamps before the original ones
were recovered.3 1 Some issues are raised that involve greater numbers of
persons, more substantive rights, or more complicated questions. Violation
of the "equal protection" clause was recently the issue for class action suits
when twelve Indian counties refused to participate in the food stamp pro-
gram ;3 the "duplicate assistance" policy of the Illinois Department of
Public Aid which authorized deductions from assistance checks for pre-
vious emergency disbursements ;89 and citizens of Colorado who had re-
ceived old age pensions and medical benefits under federal and state wel-
fare programs but lost when the 15 percent increase in Social Security
benefits in 197040 became effective.
These, of course, are examples of a few actions brought by individuals
affected by state interpretations of legislative enactments. Federal law,
however, provides an alternate means of challenging alleged unfairness.
" The late Justice Black has indicated that there is considerable judicial pre-
emption of H.E.W.'s rightful responsibility and countless law suits involving wel-
fare recipients that could be avoided if H.E.W. took the initiative in reviewing
state statutes for conformity. See Black's dissents in Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S.
397 (1970), Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970).
Civ. No. 70-C-2000 (N.D.N.Y., 1970).
"H.E.W. contended that the state must provide for equitable treatment of in-
dividuals assisted under the state plan. Determination of need and the amount of
assistance given to all recipients must be made on an equitable and objective basis.
Figures v. Swank, No. 53864 (Ill. Sup. Ct., 1970).
88 Palmer v. State of Washington, No. 714187 (Washington Super. Ct., 1970).
' Williams v. Martin, No. 402556 (Calif. Super. Ct. 1970).
8 Miller v. Martin, No. 402556 (Calif. Super. Ct., 1970).
89 Acosta v. Swank, No. 69 C 2502 (N.D. Ill., 1969). The Illinois statute was
upheld, but plaintiffs filed for reconsideration in view of H.E.W. regulation 45
C.F.R. Sect. 233.20 (a) (3) (11) (c). The regulation stipulates that only currently
available resources should be considered in determining assistance payments.
" Fullington v. Shea, No. C-2469 (D.C. Colo., Aug., 1970). Savings provisions
were incorporated in the 1972 Social Security payment increase legislation.
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In 42 U.S.C. sect. 1983,41 the deprivation of rights, privileges or im-
munities may provide an avenue for litigation. A similar remedy exists in
28 U.S.C. 1343 which permits cases to go beyond -the state courts directly
to the district courts and provides damages or other equitable relief.42
Administrative Reform
By mid-1971 over 13.6 million persons received grants equaling $5 bil-
lion under the five categorical public welfare programs.43 These programs
were designed at least minimally, to meet the needs of recipient groups,
which are comprised 55.8 percent of children, 16.7 percent mothers, 14.9
percent aged, and 11.7 percent blind and disabled. Contrary to popular
beliefs, less than one percent of the recipient group included able-bodied
fathers.4 4 The cost of these programs rises at an alarming rate each year
not only with increases in welfare rolls, but also to match the rise in eco-
nomic inflation.45 The administrative system itself has become so complex
" Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation custom
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in the action at law, suit or equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress. Relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 cannot be denied welfare
claimants on the ground that they had not first sought relief under state laws pro-
viding administrative remedies. Damico v. Calif., 88 S.Ct. 526, 389 U.S. 416, 19
L.Ed. 2d 647 (1967). The problem with this statute as with the question of rights
and privileges in general is, of course, that the persons affected are not always aware
of the remedies available and have insufficient resources to contest arbitrary de-
cisions by welfare officials.
" "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action au-
thorized by law to be commenced by any person: (1) To recover damages for
injury to his person or property, or because of the deprivation of any right or
privilege of a citizen of the United States, by any act done in furtherance of any
conspiracy mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42; (2) To recover damages from
any person who fails to prevent or to aid in preventing any wrongs mentioned in
section 1985 of Title 42 which he had knowledge were about to occur and power to
prevent; (3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State Law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured
by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for
equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States; (4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any
Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to
vote."
"Category Titles include assistance for the aged (OAA), blind (AB), per-
manently and totally disabled (APTD), and children (AFDC). A fifth category,
general assistance (GA) receives no federal funds and is completely state and
locally administered.
"Myths concerning welfare are still so strongly attached to our belief system
that in 1971 H.E.W. published a booklet entitled Welfare Myths v. Facts to offset
public criticism of welfare programs.
" In January, 1973, a person was considered eligible for federal poverty pro-
grams if his net income (in a non-farm area) was less than $2,100 per year and
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that only the most patient of scholars have ventured to penetrate its stag-
gering intricacies. The cries for Congressional reform in this area are
tempered by those who seek to facilitate the delivery of cash and services
to the recipient groups, and those who wish to close the loopholes making
the administrative burden that much more costly and difficult.
President Nixon's welfare reform proposal was introduced in 1969
and has been debated and amended in great detail, but still has failed in
passage. However, in October, 1972, a Conference Committee version of
H.R.I was signed into law.46 Significantly, the bill authorized a 1974 fed-
eralization of the categorical programs relating to the needy aged, blind,
and disabled, with a national system of uniform benefits to these groups.-
These groups have traditionally not been included in the same classification
of indigence, with the affiliated predispositions, as A.F.D.C. recipients,
presumably because they also largely fall under the heading of previous
contributors. Significantly also was passage in this bill of expanded benefits
for Social Security and Medicare recipients, which are also largely "con-
tributing" groups.
No compromise was reached with regard to the most controversial
aspects of the proposals, those which were related to Title IV, or A.F.D.C.
The Senate version of H.A.I had included provisions that would have re-
versed almost every major court decision in this area in the past five years.
These included: 90 day durational residency requirements, restrictions on
present confidentiality protections and fair hearing requirements, and pro-
hibitions against use of the declaration system, aid to unborn children,
and to non-citizens or aliens not admitted for permanent residence, and
the granting of aid to alcoholics and drug addicts. In an inability to com-
promise, supporters and foes successfully deleted Title IV from the final
bill. 4
7
The successes and failures of this measure leave us with the yet un-
answered question of what is a right which is owed by society to the re-
cipient, and what is a privilege, to be granted, withheld or made subject to
$4,200 for a family of four. The expansion rate which has proved especially irk-
some to legislators and constituents alike has been in the A.F.D.C. program, at 15
percent per annum. This may be one additional reason for the large number of
cases reaching the courts concerning infringement of rights of A.F.D.C. re-
cipients.
"'PL 92-60341 U.S.L.W. 107 (U.S., Nov. 24, 1972).
" Pressure was exerted by the National Welfare Rights Organizations, Coali-
tion for Adequate Welfare Reform Now, the AFL-CIO, the U.A.W., the League
of Women Voters, Common Cause, the American Civil Liberties Union, and many
others. For a discussion of the various proposals and Congressional action see the
Welfare Law News (New York: Center for Social Welfare Policy and Law, Nov.,
1972).
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legislatively imposed conditions. In spite of considerable effort by welfare
rights groups to merge .the two concepts in the past,4 8 and continued ac-
tions through the courts, there remains a legislatively imposed distinction
which is based on cultural and moralistic precedent.
"An excellent discussion of this topic is contained in James P. Cooney and
H. David Prior, "Social Welfare-An Emerging Doctrine of Statutory Entitle-
ment," 44 Notre Dante Lawyer, 603 (1969).
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